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ADDRESS
PRODUCT LIABILITY:
CURSE OR BULWARK OF FREE ENTERPRISE*
GuImO CALABRESI**
N JULY OF 1978 the Secretary of Commerce, Juanita Kreps, speaking for the
Carter Administration, proposed a "comprehensive program to attack the
problem of escalating product liability premiums and costs."' The ad-
ministration felt compelled to become involved because:
Serious product liability problems have affected thousands of small
businesses that have had great difficulty in obtaining affordable
product liability insurance. The problem has also affected con-
sumers because insurance costs have been passed on to them in terms
of higher prices. Consumer groups have also been concerned about
restrictive new state laws that have attacked the problem by limiting
the rights of persons to recover damages for injuries caused by
defective products. Finally, insurers have expressed concern about
court rulings imposing substantial damages in product liability
cases.
2
Despite the inconsistencies which abound in the government's statement
of why it is troubled, there is no question that the administration's intervention
reflected a serious concern, among many quite disparate groups, that the
increase in size and frequency of product liability judgments somehow was
undermining the capacity of American business to function as it should in a
free enterprise system. Typically, the government's proposed approach
involved tax changes as a short-range measure (a quite sensible ten year loss
carry-back), and a "balanced program that will relieve the product liability
problem for American businesses while fully respecting the rights and
interests of consumers'" as a longer run solution. The keystone of this last
approach would be a uniform "balanced code that will add needed stability to
product liability law" to control the "uncertainties in the tort system."
4
What the government and the various states which have also reacted to the
product liability "crisis" by passing "codes" have not faced, however, is the
fact that the "uncertainties" they would abolish to a large extent only reflect
*This Address was delivered as the Thirteenth Cleveland-Marshall Fund Visiting Scholar
Lecture, by Professor Calabresi on Friday, January 19,1979, at the Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law of the Cleveland State University.
-* B.S., LL.B., M.A., Yale Univ.; A.B., M.A., Oxford Univ.; LL.D (Hon.), Notre Dame Univ.;
Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Univ.
t U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, "Secretary Kreps Announces Initiatives for Addressing the
Product Liability Problem," No. G 78-115, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE NEWS, July 20, 1978, at 1.
2 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, "Background Paper," No. G 78-115, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE
NEWS, July 20, 1978, at 1.
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the risks inherent in the manufacture and use of complex and even of simple
products. Uncertainty and risk are allocated and occasionally misallocated by
the tort system, but they are not caused by it. As a result, the proposed codes
may well reallocate or shift the burdens of accident risks and uncertainty, in
part or in whole, from the manufacturer (on whom tort law has increasingly
placed it) back to the consumer, under the guise of creating standards, but
they are unlikely to diminish the actual degree of uncertainty and risk being
borne by manufacturers and consumers jointly. They are unlikely to do so
unless, of course, they go considerably further and attempt to remove the risk
from both manufacturer and user and socialize it, that is, spread it through
some kind of governmental insurance program paid out of general revenues.
This last possibility, though certainly not in the forefront of current
legislative efforts, 5 is never to be excluded. For it is only in this way that the
government can in fact achieve what it claims to be striving for: to "relieve the
product liability problem for American businesses while fully respecting the
rights and interests of consumers."' Thus, government intervention can too
readily become the easy compromise when organized consumer groups and
manufacturer associations each try to avoid bearing risk and uncertainty and,
at the same time, refuse to pay the price of having the other group bear that
same risk and uncertainty.
It is worth emphasizing that in the government's explanation of why there
is a crisis, the phrase "[t]he problem has also affected consumers because
insurance costs have been passed on to them in terms of higher prices,"
immediately precedes the phrase "consumer groups have been concerned
about . .. state laws .. . limiting the rights of persons to recover damages
for injuries caused by defective products."7 In other words, consumers would
prefer neither to bear the risk of having some accidents for which no
compensation is available, nor to bear the cost of paying for someone else -
the manufacturer - to bear analogous risks. Manufacturers feel the same way
about it. Thus, when the government says "small businesses . . . have had
great difficulty in obtaining affordable product liability insurance," 8 what it
actually is saying is that small businesses do not wish to bear the cost of having
insurance companies take over the burden of risk from them.
The "solution" of shifting the loss to the government, unlike the current
product liability "crisis," would, however, have serious implications for a free
enterprise system. To see why, one must consider: (a) the ways in which a
society can "manage" risk and uncertainty; (b) which of these ways are
consistent with free enterprise; and (c) which, instead, at least in the long run,
tend to undercut such a system. In considering these, it is important to
remember that risk and uncertainty, and, therefore, defective products and
accidents in their use, exist in all societies whether "free enterprise" or
"socialist" or "mixed." The question, then, is not whether risk will exist but
- See id., at 1. " '[T]he overwhelming majority of businesses [are] not looking for a "federal
handout" to resolve the problem'. These businesses [agree] with the Commerce Department that
a federal insurance or reinsurance program [is] not the solution." Id.
6 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 1, at 1.
I U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 1.
I Id. (emphasis added).
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rather how societies will choose to "manage" that risk, how they will decide to
control it and limit it, and whom they will wish, in the end, to burden with it.
I. THREE WAYS OF CONTROLLING RISK
There are, in essence, three different approaches to the control and
allocation of risk. The first is what I have elsewhere called the "contractual" or
"property" approach. The second is the regulatory criminal law way. And the
third is the "torts" or "liability rule" method.9
In the first approach, the government, in effect, lets the parties themselves
decide who is best suited to manage the risks and uncertainties inherent in a
situation (for example, in the manufacture and use of products). The
government's principal role here is to enforce the solutions, or more
specifically, the contracts, at which the parties have arrived. A starting point,
where the loss lies in the absence of a contract, must be established either
implicitly, as by custom, or explicitly, as by law. This is necessary because,
without such a starting point, it would be difficult for the parties to arrive at an
agreement as to who should bear or manage the risks they jointly face.
In product liability situations, however, the starting point itself is relatively
unimportant. This is in contrast to situations like auto accidents, where the
starting point is bound to become the end point - since even nominal
negotiations as to who ought to bear the risk between the potential injurer and
the potential victim, pedestrian and driver for example, are usually
impossible - and where as a result this first approach inevitably transforms
itself into the third, or tort, method. In the product liability area, the parties
could, in theory, by explicit or implicit contract, reverse that starting point
and, also in theory, would do so whenever it suited their joint interest, whether
one began with strict producer liability or caveat emptor. The function of the
courts, under this approach, would be no more than to determine, as they
supposedly did in the probably mythical and in any case long-dead world of
pure contract, the intent of the parties as to where the risk should lie for a price
paid."
The key to this approach is the belief that the government knows very
little. It does not know who is relatively unaverse to risk and hence wishes to
bear risks for a price. It does not know who can best act to reduce risks by
adding or designing safety devices or by being more prudent in the use of a
product. And certainly it does not know, better than the parties themselves,
what risks ought to be avoided or forbidden and what risks are, instead, worth
bearing. Despite the obvious problems with this approach in the raw,
elements of it remain an important part of any legal system which reflects a
"free enterprise" society, at least in those areas like product safety where,
nominally, transactions between the parties are possible.
The second approach represents the other ideological extreme. The
assumption made under it is that the government or its agents know better
I See Calabresi and Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972), which examines society's use of property, criminal,
and liability rules to protect and regulate "entitlements." Conceptually, allocation of risk is the
converse of protection of entitlements.
10 Cf. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
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than the parties themselves not only who can best manage risks, but even what
risks are worth taking and what risks are too great. Under it, risk is not
abolished, but it is socialized. A decision is made as to which safety measures
will be required and which instead are too costly. This decision is then
enforced criminally, and compensation, out of general revenues, is given to
those who lose as a result of the decision. For the parties, uncertainty is ended,
but they are given in its place the certainty of the bureaucratic decision,
whether they like it or not.
Even the most "free enterprise" of societies adopts this regulatory-
criminal approach in some situations. (Two-year-olds are forbidden to drive
cars and might well be even in a totally laissez-faire state.) To the extent,
however, that a society believes in free enterprise, it is likely to look
skeptically on this solution. For if the government is the best assessor of what
risks and what innovations are worthwhile, as well as of who ought to bear the
burdens of risk and innovation, there is very little reason to permit private
enterprise to exist at all. After all, the raison d'etre of private enterprise is that
it can respond to the needs and desires of the people in a society better than
the government can, and it can and will take risks which a bureaucrat might be
inclined to reject but which, nonetheless, will benefit society and are worth
taking. Any society which too readily assumes that accident risks are best
managed and borne by the government, through regulation and compensa-
tion, is by that very assumption casting deep doubts on the utility, and hence,
inevitably, on the viability of private enterprises.
This is not to say that such an approach may not be adopted through near-
sightedness and even with the support of those who, in theory, should be most
concerned to fight it, the entrepreneurs themselves. In the short run, this
approach can protect the entrepreneurs from risks which both they and
consumer groups would rather avoid. For many an existing enterprise the
socialization of a risk and its removal from it or its customers is a net benefit,
even if it entails regulation (as Adam Smith himself noted two centuries ago).
At the very least it makes entry of new competitors more difficult. As a result,
the fact that this second approach in the end undermines the enterprise system
and its possible benefits, unfortunately, is all too often the concern only of the
theoretician.
The third - or torts - method is, as I have elsewhere noted, an
ideologically mixed approach.I The government is assumed to know, better
than the parties, at least in some instances, who can best manage the risks and
uncertainties involved. It, or its agents, can best decide - under this method
- who ought to bear a loss and who can act, either through precaution or
inventiveness, to reduce loss or the risk of loss in the future. In this sense, the
torts method resembles the regulatory approach since it does not necessarily
let the parties reverse that decision simply because they believe otherwise. It
also determines the level of compensation and damages in a collective way,
rather than letting the parties determine what the costs of an accident are or
set limits on recoverable losses.'2
II See Calabresi, Torts - The Law of the Mixed Society, in AMERICAN LAW: THE THIRD
CEN-rUY 103 (B. Schwartz ed. 1976).
1 In effect this last step is the same as the previous one since a limit set on a recoverable loss is
no different from a decision to put part of the loss on one party and the rest on the other.
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Once it has decided the level of loss and who should bear the risk of that
loss, however, the torts approach steps back and lets the party on whom the
risk is placed "manage" it. It does not decide for the parties what risks are
worth bearing, but rather lets those on whom it has placed the risk make the
decision between risk avoidance and risk bearing. It establishes, collectively,
who bears the incentive to manage the risks and uncertainties, but lets those
risks and uncertainties be controlled in a free enterprise way. In this sense, it
starts to resemble the first, or contractual, approach, which also leaves the
management of risks to non-governmental bodies, and is, like it, consistent
with an ideology which believes that risks are best evaluated by private rather
than governmental entities.
II. PRODUCT LIABILITY: A MIXED APPROACH
Product liability today is an interesting mixture of the first (the
contractual) and the third (the tort) approaches. As such, it would seem to be
eminently suited to the kind of free enterprise society we have adopted in our
society. Indeed the analogue between the theory of product liability, and the
way our society decides the questions of what goods and services are worth
producing, is striking and merits examination. What then is wrong; why are
we facing a crisis?
Before considering this issue further, I would like (a) to describe more
precisely the mixture between the first and the third approaches which
product liability represents; (b) to consider the basis for the judgment made in
the "tort" side of that mixture as to who should bear and manage uncertainty
and risk; and (c) to draw an analogy between the above points and how our
society decides the questions of innovation and entrepreneurial entry
generally. Only then can I return, briefly, to the question of what is wrong and
why people are troubled enough to cause me, at least, to fear that we may
move increasingly toward the second or regulatory approach, however much
we may, in theory, eschew it.
Product liability, unlike many areas of torts where the initial decision (as to
who is best suited to bear the risk of loss and to decide between spending
money to avoid the loss and paying for the loss if it occurs) is not reversible by
the parties either as a practical matter or as a result of legal rules, gives the
parties considerable room to alter the collective decision on risk bearing. But
unlike the contractual approach, which in theory lets the burden of risk be
decided entirely by the parties, product liability regularly limits the use even
of express agreements to shift the loss from where it was placed by the "tort"
approach. The occasional willingness to let the parties rearrange by contract
- so to speak - some of the allocation of risk does not result solely from the
fact that negotiations are, at least nominally, feasible in product liability and
are not in many other areas of law. There are simply too many other tort
situations, such as workmen's compensation, where transactions between the
parties are just as feasible and where a case-by-case renegotiation of the
allocation of risk is forbidden for that explanation to be acceptable.
I would suggest, instead, that the "tort" decision to make the producer
bear the risk of loss is in many instances a sufficiently fragile one so that the
society believes that in these instances the parties are best suited to decide the
allocation of the risk themselves. Thus, the existence of a "defect" (especially
1978]
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of a design defect) is inexorably linked to adequacy of warning, obviousness
of risk, and expectations as to the use to which a product will be put. And the
meaning of all these terms is, inevitably, affected by express, and even
implied, agreements among the parties. The suggestion inescapably is that the
collective decision as to who can manage the risk best in this area, unlike
workmen's compensation, at times depends on which of the parties "prefers"
to take on the risk.
Yet the approach is far from the first or contractual one, as the
manufacturers who complain about what has happened to product liability in
the last years know all too well. Whether the discussion is put in terms of the
"fairness" of disclaimers and of exculpatory agreements, as it was in
Henningsen,13 or in other forms of words, the fact remains that many an
attempt to rearrange the allocation of risk will be deemed void. And while at
times it will be deemed void because the parties didn't really agree to the
reallocation, it will often be barred because, in our ideologically mixed
society, it was thought that the parties did not know (perhaps could not
know?) as well as the lawmakers who was best suited to bear and manage the
risk. In other words, it was thought that, as to that attempt to restructure the
allocation of risk, the tort approach rather than the contract approach should
prevail.
At times, and rather foolishly, the distinction between areas where the tort
and contract approaches should govern is put in terms of "property" damage
as against "personal" injury. The risk of loss in the first, it is said, can readily be
reassigned contractually, while as to the second disclaimers are not
acceptable. Let us, however, consider a potential consumer and a pair of
toasters, a cheap one which involves a slight risk of a minor burn on one's
finger when one removes the toast and an expensive one which avoids that risk
for a substantial price. The cheap toaster, let us also assume, clearly spells out
the minor risk of "personal" injury. It is easy to conclude that product liability
ought to decline to find a defect if a buyer decides to buy the cheap toaster and
take his chances. The case seems close to that of a cheap toaster which, being
cheap, is expected to break sooner than a fancy one.
Conversely, consider another, more fanciful, case of a cheap and an
expensive toaster. The cheap toaster, this time, entails risk of fire in one in a
million cases but has a built-in alarm so that personal injury is virtually ruled
out. The likelihood of major property damage (destruction of a whole house)
is, nonetheless, great if a fire occurs. Would we think that a statement in a
warranty that occasionally such toasters can overheat and result in fires would
avoid manufacturer liability for such a fire? Would our new hypothesis
change simply because the consumer chose to purchase the cheap toaster
despite the existence of a more expensive toaster which would have avoided
the problem? I think not.
Perhaps my instincts on such hypotheticals are wrong, but I doubt it,
particularly when I think of the language which would be used to describe the
situation in many of those cases if they ever came to court. Perhaps, the line
drawn in such cases is not a desirable one. But, even if this were so, it would,
for the moment, be beside the point I am making. The point is that the system
we have come to, which we call product liability, seems, at times, but only at
13 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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times, to impose liability on manufacturers in the face of the parties' seeming
willingness to reallocate the risk, while at other times it seems quite ready to
let the user take the burden on him or herself. Moreover, the distinction
between when it will and when it won't, though one which we can often
predict, is not one that can easily be described by catch words like "property"
and "personal injury." Rather, it seems to reflect a deeper notion of the kinds
of situations in which our mixed society believes that individuals are best
suited to determine who can manage risk and the kinds of situations in which
that choice is best made collectively. In either case, however, if the product
liability approach prevails, the risk, once allocated, is managed by the
individuals involved and not by some collective entity. They, and not the
government by regulation, decide whether to spend to avoid the risk or to
bear it.
Having said that sometimes product liability does let the risk be
"reallocated" by the parties, it is important to emphasize again that both the
starting point and the reluctance to permit shifting in many instances indicate
that the "tort" side of product liability is not only crucial but does tend today
to put and keep the risk of loss on the producer rather than the user. The tort
decision made by current product liability law is the opposite of the standard
tort position of one hundred years ago, both in and outside the "product" field.
In fact, this may be understating the situation as it exists today, since even user
negligence is frequently no defense. Traditional tort law, even apart from the
special defenses accorded to remote contractors, put the risk of loss on the
victim unless some rather special circumstances, like injurer fault (strictly
construed), existed. Today, in product liability, the risk is initially placed on
the producer and remains there unless complex circumstances, more
powerful than user fault, justify a shift in riskbearing from producer to user. 14
What is the justification, in an enterprise or mixed society, for this initial
allocation of risk and for this reluctance to allow it to be shifted? What, in
other words, is the relation between producer liability, as a starting point, and
the theory of free enterprise? It is to that question which I will now briefly
turn.
III. PRODUCER LIABILITY AND THE THEORY OF FREE ENTERPRISE
A free enterprise system, which is not concerned with distributional or
spreading issues as grounds for loss allocations, 15 will assign the risk of
accident losses on the basis of four factors: relative knowledge of the risk
among the relevant parties, relative capacity to control or reduce that risk,
relative lack of aversion to risk taking, and relative capacity to enter into
transactions to correct an error in risk allocation if the first three factors were
incorrectly evaluated. These four factors combine to define the cheapest
possible cost avoider to whom the incentive-based enterprise society assigns
risk. 16
In a product liability situation, the fourth factor enters in a somewhat
"4 Cf. Calabresi and Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055
(1972).
" For a discussion of the distributional and spreading concerns which do affect our loss
allocation systems, see Calabresi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
1" See id.
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unusual way, for "transactions" of some sort between buyer and seller are
almost always possible. In such instances, the factor then asks us to look not to
whether there is an asymmetry in capacity to initiate transactions, but rather
to whether there is an asymmetry of knowledge among the parties so that
meaningful transactions are more likely to occur if the burden is initially
placed on one rather than on the other party. Thus stated, the fourth factor
becomes readily conflated with the first, which already asks about
asymmetries in knowledge, or what is the same thing, relative knowledge of
risk among the parties. It is, in fact, this combined factor which often
underlies the current legal tendency to allocate risks of losses to producers
rather than users. Producers are thought to be more likely to know the risks
involved in complex products and more capable of initiating meaningful
transactions to shift these risks to users (if "meaningful" transactions are
possible at all) in those cases in which users are the better risk bearers.' 7
The second factor is the most contradictory one. On the one hand the
producer frequently has available the best means of controlling the risk, both
because knowledge of risk is a prerequisite to control and because he or she
can introduce safer, albeit more costly, alternatives either by applying current
technology or by investing in research. On the other hand, the user frequently
can also control risk by avoiding foolish uses or by making use of some specific
knowledge about significant alternatives that are in his or her control.,
There is considerable doubt, of course, as to whether financial incentives,
like letting the loss lie on the user, significantly affect user care. The argument
is frequently made that if the user understands the risk, that, by itself, will lead
to care, regardless of any compensation rule, while if he or she doesn't
understand the risk, placing the loss on the user will have little effect. It will be
like putting a handkerchief on a blanket, only worse, since the handkerchief, if
left on the other side, would be an effective cover. But this argument - in
practice - amounts to no more than the statement that the first factor,
"relative knowledge" of risk (in the full sense of psychological understanding
of it), is so dominant that except in unusual situations, it should control and
lead to a general starting point of producer liability. Under this hypothesis, the
starting point could be altered - even by transactions - only when the
negotiations seemed truly to give the user a full understanding of the risk.
Unless, however, one is clearer than I am prepared to be on the relative
significance of the first and second factors and on the capacity of individual
17 By "meaningful" I mean transactions in which there is a rough parity of knowledge.
Liability on the party who has greater knowledge, together with a requirement that transactions
designed to shift that liability be meaningful, induces the party with knowledge to share it with
the other party.
Is Consider, for example, the area of contraceptive devices and techniques. Each device or
technique has a different risk of pregnancy and a different risk of side effects. The producer may
be in a better position to know the statistical risks - both of pregnancy and of side effects - and
would seem to be more capable of sponsoring further research and improvements on
contraceptive products. The user, however, is surely in the best position to evaluate the harm
caused by contraceptive failure, for the user knows whether a pregnancy is unwanted merely
because of timing preference or because it would be a major catastrophe. In addition the user
may be in a better position to determine whether a particular contraceptive presents a substantial
risk of side effects to him or her. Finally, the consumer is almost certainly better placed to control
faulty or careless use. All of this is quite apart from the evident danger of "moral hazard" - in the
technical sense - which would result from producer liability in such cases.
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users to respond to incentives, there are bound to be situations in which the
first two factors leave us perplexed. Cases will arise in which we are not sure
which of the parties is likely to be the cheapest cost avoider and in which we
have no faith in the parties' capacity to decide the question of who is the best
manager of the risk for themselves by contract. This last is especially true if we
doubt that the user, for example, has enough knowledge to determine
intelligently whether or not he or she can manage the risk, while we do not see
any product or research alternative available to the producer to control the
risk. But there are analogous situations in which the first two factors leave us
perplexed, and yet we are unwilling to give much weight to a determination
by the parties as to who is best suited to bear the risk.
In all such situations, and even in some in which the first two factors do
give us some guidance, we are likely to look to the third factor - the relative
risk aversion of the parties, the relative willingness of the parties to take a
chance, for a price. At first blush, this factor would always seem to suggest a
dominance of the contractual element in product liability. Who, after all,
knows best their willingness to gamble except the parties? But that knowledge
can only find useful expression in a negotiation if the parties understand the
risk as to which they are gambling. As a result, the contractual approach leads
us right back to the first factor - that of the relative knowledge of the risk
among the parties - and, therefore, to our hypothesized perplexity.
There is, however, something which can be said about the third factor
which is independent of knowledge of risk in the individual case and which
depends, instead, directly on the status of the parties. It is, I would suggest, a
fact that is crucial to an understanding of the link between a rule favoring
entrepreneur liability in product injury cases and the permanence of the free
enterprise system.
Bearing risk is both the function of, and justification for, private enterprise
in a free enterprise society. Profits, as against monopoly returns, rents, or
simple compensation for use of labor or capital, accrue to those who have
taken uninsurable risks and won the gamble. Free enterprise is prized, in
classical economics, precisely because it fosters the creation of entrepreneurs
who will take such uninsurable risks, who will, in other words, gamble on
uncertainty and demonstrate their utility by surviving - by winning more
often than others. Whether they do so through skill or luck, such "minimizers"
of the costs of uninsurable risks are worth their pay because only through
them can any headway be made in reducing such uninsurable costs.
Frequently, the accident costs involved in product liability situations are
exactly of this sort. That is precisely why we often are not able to say that the
producer or the user is best suited to manage the risk; in these situations, the
means of managing the risks are not currently available and require skills of
innovation or invention. This is exactly the reason why insurance is dear or
unavailable in such instances.
All this is not to say that enterprises are anxious or even willing to bear such
entrepreneurial risks; far from it! They are often -very averse to risk bearing.
And they will try hard to shift the loss to the user, who may take it - if
permitted to - occasionally because he or she really is a gambler and likes the
risk for the fee, but who more often accepts the risk for a price acceptable to
the producer only because he or she does not understand, does not know, how
1978]
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great the risk in fact is. It is here that the law frequently steps in and refuses to
allow that kind of risk shifting. Thus, where the transaction clearly bespeaks a
genuine difference in willingness to take risk, the third factor - which of the
parties is less averse to bearing the risk - would favor allowing a contractual
view to prevail. But where there is doubt, the third factor will tend, instead, to
insist that the risk be placed, and be kept, on the entrepreneur - who most
often is the producer.
It does not matter, from this point of view, that there may be a particular
buyer/user who may enjoy risk taking. He or she is not really deprived by
being denied this chance to take a risk. For he or she can always become an
astronaut or racing driver or find other ways of satisfying his or her desire for
risk. Indeed, he or she can even become an entrepreneur. There is no lack of
demand, need, and pay for willing risk takers in our society. Nor does it
matter that the particular producer may hate to take risks - may be highly
risk averse. If so, he or she should get out of a business which entails
uninsurable risks or risks which can only be shifted to others at extraordinarily
high prices. For it is these extraordinarily high prices which permit the willing
taker of the risk to make the profits appropriate to the fact that he or she is
fulfilling an entrepreneur's role.
What is not permitted, in a free enterprise society, is what all too often
producers, and equally often consumers, seek: to avoid both the bearing of
the uninsurable risk and the payment of a price sufficient to induce someone
else to bear that risk. That is, however, exactly what the complaints of the
consumers and small manufacturers mentioned by the Secretary of
Commerce amount to.' 9
That the consumer wishes to duck both is not a matter of great concern to
the free enterprise system - unless, as we shall see, the producer succeeds in
shifting the risk to him. It is not necessary to an enterprise system that
consumers be willing to bear uninsurable risks. Consumer complaints about
prices, moreover, are inevitable in an enterprise system (since all prices are, in
a sense, regressive taxes) and will not be much diminished whatever is done
with accident cost related price increases. 20
That the producer wishes to avoid bearing such risks or paying a price
sufficient to shift them to a knowledgeable purchaser (like an insurance
company which would have to be permitted to charge entrepreneurial rates),
is far more serious. For it represents an unwillingness of the private sector to
take on the function of bearing incentives to innovate and thus to diminish
those costs which cannot be given an actuarial basis. It represents, in other
words, an unwillingness to take on the very task which a free enterprise
society, classically, does not believe the government does well: the
management of risk, uncertainty, and innovation. And if the private sector is
unwilling to take on the task which ultimately justifies its existence, it will not
"9 The consumer is described as "affected" by product prices that are too high, yet - when he
has knowledge, that is, speaks through organized consumer groups - he objects to bearing the
risk. At the same time, the producer complains that he cannot afford insurance against the
equivalent risks. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 1.
20 It is significant that the "Background Paper," supra note 2, did not describe consumers as
complaining as a result of higher prices stemming from product liability judgments, but,
correctly, as "affected" by these.
[Vol. 27:313
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol27/iss3/3
PRODUCT LIABILITY
be long before people will ask, with good reason, why should we have it at all?
There are, they will say, some things which government does better than
private enterprise. If private enterprise ducks those tasks, like risk taking,
which it can do better than government, in order to gain an admittedly short
run economic advantage, it will jeopardize its long run survival. For at that
point, private enterprise will be left to do only those things which it does not
do especially well.
This undermining of free enterprise as a result of the unwillingness of
producers to be the risk-prone parties (in those situations where the other
factors which govern the allocation of product risks are not determinative),
moreover, can occur even more directly. Producers who are unwilling to bear
product liability risks and to face bankruptcy (an old free enterprise result,
after all) when they manage such risks worse than their competitors, and who
are also unwilling to pay entrepreneurial rates to insurance companies for
bearing those risks to which actuarially-based rates cannot be given, will seek,
as they are seeking, to reduce their risks to levels which can be covered
actuarially. But this entails shifting the "uninsurable" part of the risk to the
user. That is both what many currently proposed laws seek to do and what
consumers will ultimately refuse to accept. They are no more willing to accept
risk than are entrepreneurs. Just as "organized consumer groups" object to
such a shifting now, because they understand the risks involved, so will
disorganized consumers object when some of them are destroyed as a result
of being burdened with huge, uncompensated product injury costs.
It is at this point, with no one willing to bear the "uninsurable risk," that
such catastrophe costs will, inevitably, be placed on the government. The
consumers, who have no short run interest in preserving the private sector,
and who have a great interest in avoiding such uncompensated losses, will
accept no less. And, just as inevitably, the government will try to "manage" the
risks by issuing ever more safety regulations. Since there will be no financial
incentives to minimize the sum of accident and accident avoidance costs,
regulatory ones will be demanded! We will then have moved, perhaps
without full consciousness but inexorably, from the current mixed tort-
contract approach to the regulatory-criminal one. We will have shifted, as a
result of an unwillingness on the part of entrepreneurs to bear, and hence to
manage, uncertainty, to governmental control of uncertainty. This type of risk
management is neither effective nor desirable, at least when applied across the
board, and whether desirable or not, it is fundamentally inconsistent with a
free enterprise approach.
IV. FREE ENTERPRISE AS A GENERAL SYSTEM OF STifCT LIABILITY
The problem facing industry in the product liability context is not, in the
end, very different from the problem which faces a free enterprise society
generally in deciding what goods are worth producing and what new entrants
into an industry are worth having. These decisions, like the ones we have been
discussing, can be made governmentally, or they can be made by private
entrepreneurs, who bear the losses and get the gains of the risks and gambles
they take. Indeed, the whole free enterprise system can be described as a
system of strict liability designed to provide incentives to the appropriate
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parties to bear and manage the uninsurable risks of innovation in the
production of goods and devices.
As such, it can be contrasted with a "regulatory" system, which would
instead decide collectively what new entrants and what new goods are worth
having. Those goods or entrants deemed desirable would be issued the
equivalent of a certificate of necessity and utility (which today governs entry
in those relatively few areas of our economy in which free enterprise is not
admitted) .21 Once such entry was allowed or deemed desirable at a collective-
governmental level, neither profits nor bankruptcy would be necessary. The
decision that the product or entrant was wanted and was worthwhile would
have been made by the the government; both positive and negative incentives
(profits and losses) for private parties to make that decision well would be
superfluous. And, once again, that absence of profits, and the unwillingness to
let individual enterprises suffer bankruptcy, characterizes those areas of our
economy in which entry is governmentally determined.
In most areas of the economy today, the approach is different.
Entrepreneurs are encouraged to take their chances. If they guess right and a
product or service is desired in the market - that is, if it somehow creates
benefits greater than its costs - they will be called successful innovators and
reap often quite spectacular profits. If they guess wrong and the costs of the
product - again as determined in the market - are greater than its benefits,
they may suffer huge losses and even be wiped out.
Although this discussion has concerned regular entrepreneurial-product
risks, not accident risks, the analogy is extraordinarily close. As with product-
accident risks, our society starts out by allocating ordinary product-
production risks in ways which try to maximize the chances that incentives
will be placed on those most suited to "manage" these risks. Thus most, but
not all, of the risk is put on the entrepreneur (the investor); some, as a result of
bankruptcy and limited liability laws, is put on creditors. This is only wise, for
there are situations in which the creditor is in the best position to manage the
risk, to blow the whistle as it were, and in that way to reduce the social cost of a
mistaken entrepreneurial decision.
The allocation of entrepreneurial risks in a free enterprise society is thus
similar to product liability risk allocation. In both areas, some risks are best
handled by a party other than the entrepreneur. The starting point, however,
remains entrepreneur liability. Some contractual modifications of this initial
starting point are permitted, but, as in product liability, not all. Here too,
sometimes the contracting parties are well suited to decide who can best
manage the product-production risk, while at other times the allocation of
that risk is thought to be best decided by the society, and individuals are
barred from shifting it.
All this, like product liability, is not only consistent with free enterprise, it
is in fact the legal context which defines our free enterprise system. What
would not be consistent with free enterprise would be general governmental
action to prevent failures and bankruptcy, that is, a general governmental
taking over of entrepreneurial losses. For this, no less than a confiscation of
profits, would amount to a removal of the incentive from the private sector to
21 Typically this occurs in such "non-profit" areas as the construction of a new hospital.
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"manage" uninsurable risk in product-production wisely. What, in the long
run, would also be inconsistent with the survival of private enterprise, would
be limited liability rules which shifted much of the entrepreneurial risk to the
non-entrepreneur consumer (in contradistinction to rules which correctly
allow such shifting to different entrepreneurial groups, like banks).
Consumers who bore too great an entrepreneurial burden, like consumers
who bore the risk of major, uncompensated, product-related injuries, would
soon enough question a system which gave entrepreneurs so little incentive to
avoid losses and yet let them enter freely and keep the profits when things
worked out well. They would clamor for government compensation, risk
management, and inevitably control of entry and profits. The analogy to what
I see as a danger in current reactions to the product liability "crisis" would then
be complete.
V. THE CURRENT CRISIS
If I am correct and product liability is not only an appropriate way for an
enterprise society to handle product-related accident risks, but is a close
analogue to the way in which such a society handles entrepreneurial risks
generally, what is wrong; what is the reason for the current crisis? Is it no more
than the disheartening fact that many of those who ought to be the staunchest
defenders of the enterprise system are too near-sighted and would trade that
system for immediate advantage? Or worse, is it that they have lost the
willingness to gamble, to take those risks which place them at the core of the
enterprise system?
Each of these reasons has certainly contributed to the product liability
crisis as is suggested by attempts by business in other areas to look to the
government and to regulation for protection from risks.2 2 But that is not the
whole answer by any means. There are things wrong with the product liability
system which can and should be corrected, and the correction of which would
in no way impugn the willingness of producers to bear product-related
accident risks. This lecture does not permit a thorough discussion of these
weaknesses, but some of them can be listed.
The first and most obvious are the unnecessarily high administrative costs
of the system. These costs are not only a burden in themselves but create yet
further costs. A system sufficiently complex to require expensive lawyering
entails, if it is to be fair, that lawyers be available to rich, poor, and middle
income people alike. In the torts context, this means the necessary persistence
of contingent fees. Contingent fees, in turn, mean that there must be some
item of damage which can be "larger than life" and sufficiently expandable to
cover not only actual damages and fees in the particular case but also the fees
in all the cases the lawyer loses. That item of damages, unlimited pain and
suffering, inevitably takes on a life of its own and becomes both a source of
further administrative expense and a basis for legal-blackmail which jacks up
small injury claims.
I do not wish to be taken as criticizing contingent fees, or even pain and
'2 An example is Lockheed Aircraft Company's flight to government support, and the
reluctance of the airline industry to accept de-regulation.
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suffering damages. Far from it, for once we admit as the starting point the
current techniques for determining product liability, they are no more than a
private mutual insurance system to cover legal fees. As such, they are the best
we can do, and are even admirable when compared to most government legal
aid programs. 23 That, however, is not the issue. Rather, it is whether some
simpler starting point which would give more automatic no-fault product
compensation could be developed. The lack of political success of true
automobile no-fault plans has made one reluctant to develop equally "simple"
approaches in product liability, but the absence of these represents a root
cause of our current crisis.
The second problem with our current system deals with insurance. To the
extent that the risk in product liability is increasingly becoming an
entrepreneurial risk, businesses must either bear it or pay entrepreneurial
rates to induce others to bear it. It is ridiculous to expect insurance companies
to take on risks which have no sound actuarial basis and yet to charge ordinary
"insurance" rates. If they are to function in this market, they must be able to
act like the old maritime companies which were risk takers, gamblers, if you
wish, and charged gamblers' prices. Yet the all too often mindless system of
insurance regulation in which we persist makes that extraordinarily difficult.
The result is that insurance companies will refuse certain risks as un-
economical. This, of course, leaves the manufacturer in the position of having
to "go naked," and bear the risk himself, even though, if rates were more
flexible, he would prefer to shift it to another "entrepreneur" - the "risk-
taking" rather than "actuarial" insurer. What happens is analogous to what
would occur in our enterprise system generally if the only form of "outside"
investment permitted were regulated-fixed income bonds, and no "outside"
investor could get a "piece of the action," of the profits, in exchange for bear-
ing an investor's risk.24
The third problem compounds the second. Our tax system makes it very
hard for the producer to bear the entrepreneurial risk himself. Insurance fees
are tax deductible, but payments into a reserve for product liability losses are
not! And indeed such losses, when they occur, are currently deductible
against past "profits" only to a very limited extent - three years. It is because
the government's "short-run" proposal addresses this last issue, by allowing a
ten year loss carry-back, that I called it admirable. It should be obvious that if
we wish to have entrepreneurs bear the entrepreneurial risk involved in
product safety, we must give them the incentive to do so. If insurance
companies are to take some of it, they must be allowed to charge
entrepreneurial rates, while if producers prefer to bear it themselves, they
must not be taxed on what are (at least in retrospect) only false profits.
The fourth problem with our existing system is, of course, the notorious
'3 Cf. Calabresi, Access to lustice and Substantive Law Reform: Legal Aid for the Middle
Class, in III AccEss TO JUSTICE, EMERGING PERSPECTIVES AND ISSUES (M. Cappelletti ed. 1978).
24 It is interesting to note that in the latter situation one result would be that bond rates
generally would increase to somewhere between the appropriate "loan" and " entrepreneur" risk
levels. An analogous price increase is likely to occur in the regulated insurance market. Regulated
insurance rates tend to rise to a point which, while perhaps insufficient to cover true
entrepreneurial risks, is higher than is justified to cover areas in which no such risks are involved.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that both insurance companies and those they
insure are unhappy!
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end-run which product liability currently permits around workmen's
compensation, especially in machine tools. I need not spend time on this.
What is disturbing about it is not that injured workers receive higher awards
than those provided by compensation laws which are often ridiculously
outdated and inflation-gutted. The problem arises because the end-run entails
enormous and unnecessary administrative costs and legal fees, while at the
same time creating precedents which may make little sense in other product
liability areas. It seems patently ridiculous to fail to update a relatively
efficient, if still unnecessarily complex, system like workmen's compensation
and then permit the use of a far more costly approach to give the recoveries
which the first system precludes. This last problem is the most easily
correctable of all, and the fact that it has persisted and worsened is a basis for
serious pessimism as to our capacity to enact any reforms.
I could go on and list other unnecessary crosses which we bear in this area
of law. But I would quickly descend to too many minor particulars. The point
remains the same. There are corrections and improvements which can be
made and which do not imply any shift in the basic notion that entrepreneurial
risks, which often include product safety risks, should be borne by
entrepreneurs, and not by users.25 These changes basically go to creating a
legal climate, through reform of our tax regulation, and even workmen's
compensation laws, which encourages entrepreneurs - both producers and
insurers - to take on such entrepreneurial safety risks in an efficient manner.
If this is not done, entrepreneurs will increasingly shift them to the
government. At the same time, if, while the needed changes are being made,
short-sighted producers are able to take advantage of the confusion and get a
short-term benefit by shifting such risks to the users, the users will in the longer
run move these to the government. Either of these would result in a serious
undermining of the function and hence the viability of private enterprise in
our society. In that case we will look back and say, regretfully, that product
liability, which should have been a bulwark of the free enterprise system
because it is a fundamental manifestation of entrepreneurial risk taking,
became, in the end of the twentieth century, its curse!
I5 As I said earlier, there are risks which, from a purely cost avoidance point of view, are best
borne by users. If, however, users are highly anxious to "spread" such risks, and have the political
capacity to have the government take over these risks, then to compare the user potential for cost
avoidance with the producer's ability to diminish costs is simplistic. What must be compared in
that context is the incentive effect of government loss bearing with the incentive effect of
producer liability, since these become the politically realistic alternatives. See CALABRESI, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
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